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ABSTRACT 
Leading technology intensive firms have incentives to protect knowledge outflows to 
collocated firms in order to enhance the returns to R&D (Alcácer and Zhao, 2012). In this 
paper we argue that leading firms’ knowledge protection strategies are likely to discourage 
other firms from setting up new R&D establishments in their vicinity. Knowledge protection 
is facilitated by an R&D organization emphasizing internal knowledge flows drawing on 
complementary contributions by dispersed R&D units. We examine whether the presence and 
R&D organization of local technology leaders discourages inward R&D investments in an 
analysis of the (NUTS-1) regional location of 196 cross-border R&D investment projects in 
EU-15 countries during 2003-2008. While the strength of the local relevant technology 
clusters attracts inward R&D investments, investors are generally discouraged by the 
concentration of technology activities due to the presence of regional technology leaders in 
the industry. This discouraging effect occurs specifically in case the leaders exhibit an 
internally oriented R&D organization drawing on cross-border intra-firm knowledge flows in 
their technology development activities. Our study challenges the common notion in the 
literature on clusters and innovation that agglomeration is generally associated with greater 
knowledge spillovers. 
 
Keywords: Multinational firms; R&D; location choice;  
JEL codes: F230; O320; R39 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Foreign multinational firms are responsible for a sizeable share of R&D investment in 
most European countries (OECD, 2007). Host country governments seek to attract these R&D 
investments since they provide numerous benefits to their region, such as highly skilled 
employment and knowledge spillovers to local firms (e.g. Carlsson, 2006). Such knowledge 
spillovers resulting from clustered R&D activities favourably affect knowledge accumulation 
and economic growth of regions (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996) and attract R&D investments 
by firms seeking to benefit from local knowledge networks (Belderbos et al., 2009, Del 
Barrio-Castro and García-Quevedo, 2005, Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005).  
Recent studies have pointed out that the presence in R&D clusters is not beneficial for 
all firms (Alcácer and Zhao, 2012). While in general the agglomeration of R&D generates 
potential benefits due to increased knowledge spillovers, for technological leading firms there 
is a potentially important downside. Although incoming knowledge flows provide benefits, 
firms also face the risk that firm-specific valuable knowledge and technologies spill over to 
collocated firms, potentially undermining efforts to appropriate technologies and to earn 
returns on internal R&D efforts. The strong technology position of technologically leading 
firms creates an asymmetry: they have less to learn from incoming knowledge spillovers and 
at the same time face greater risks that valuable knowledge and frontier technologies are 
appropriated by neighbouring firms.  
Although prior studies have confirmed the role of heterogeneity in the benefits of 
collocation in empirical models, by showing that leaders are less likely to choose 
agglomerated areas for new investments (Shaver and Flyer, 2000, Chung and Alcácer, 2002b, 
Alcácer and Chung, 2007), the position and strategies of incumbent leading firms with 
existing R&D facilities have not received due attention. The asymmetry in knowledge 
spillovers implies that technology leaders with existing R&D facilities have to face the 
possibility that firms set up new R&D establishments in their vicinity to benefit from 
knowledge spillovers. To prevent this, leading firms are likely to have incentives to 
discourage new R&D establishments in their locality. Extant literature has suggested that 
firms indeed employ a number of strategies in attempts to limit knowledge outflows, such as 
limiting personnel mobility by using non-compete clauses (e.g. Marx et al., 2009, Marx, 
2011), aggressive patent enforcement strategies (e.g. Agarwal et al., 2009), and 
geographically dispersed but interrelated internal R&D activities that ensure that 
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technological knowledge developed in one location is of little use without complementary 
knowledge developed in other locations (Zhao, 2006, Alcácer and Zhao, 2012). Such 
strategies, while often intended to prevent knowledge flows to collocated firms, will also 
render new R&D investments less attractive to firms wishing to benefit from knowledge 
spillovers. 
In this paper, we address this issue by examining whether concentration of 
technological activities by local technology leaders displaying knowledge protection 
strategies discourages inward R&D investments, controlling for other relevant locational 
features. Our focus here is on knowledge internalization strategies as a potential means to 
prevent outgoing spillovers. By utilizing information on local and cross-border self-citations 
in technology leaders’ patents, we examine whether the dependence of local inventions on the 
leaders’ internal technology development activities and in particular on internal R&D abroad, 
makes regions relatively less attractive for investments. Since the presence of industry and 
regional R&D leaders has generally be seen as encouraging entry through agglomeration 
effects (Agrawal and Cockburn, 2003), a potentially discouraging effects of the presence of 
technology leaders on multinational firms' R&D location choices provides an important 
qualification to such assessments - with related policy implications. 
We examine the role of technology leaders in a R&D location study at the regional 
level across multiple countries in the EU-15. Most previous R&D studies have been 
conducted at the national level (e.g. Belderbos et al., 2009, Kumar, 2001) or focused on 
regions within one country (Autant-Bernard, 2006, Hilber and Voicu, 2010). It has however 
been shown that multinational firms take regions across multiple countries into consideration 
when they decide to locate foreign R&D investments (Thursby and Thursby, 2009, McCann 
and Mudambi, 2004). We analyse the location of 196 foreign R&D investment projects 
drawing on data provided by the Financial Times' Cross-border Investment Monitor (2003-
2008). We examine firms' location choices at the regional (NUTS-1) level and identify the 
strength of industry technology leaders as dominant players in regional R&D from the 
concentration of regional patenting activity among local firms. We analyse investment 
locations and the relationship with technology clusters and technology leaders at the relevant 
industry level. Our results suggest that, while the strength and quality of local relevant 
technology development activities attract cross-border R&D investments, investors are 
discouraged by concentrated technology development activities due to the dominance of 
regional industry leaders. This discouraging effect occurs specifically in case the leaders 
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exhibit an internally oriented R&D organization drawing on cross-border intra-firm 
knowledge flows in their technology development activities.  
Our results challenge the common premise in the literature on clusters (e.g. Storper, 
1995, Porter, 2000, Cooke, 2001) that firms will generally benefit from knowledge spillovers 
when locating in regions with clustered industrial activity. Our study highlights that 
geographical clustering and knowledge spillovers do not necessarily co-occur, but that 
knowledge spillovers are conditional on incumbent firms’ strategic behaviour.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROPOSITIONS 
We provide a brief review of two relevant literature streams: the literature on 
agglomeration economies and firms’ location decisions, and the literature on strategies to 
prevent knowledge spillovers. We proceed by suggesting a base proposition on the negative 
correlation between concentrated technology ownership and location choice, after which we 
derive two propositions on the effects of knowledge internalization strategies of technology 
leaders.  
 
Agglomeration Economies 
Agglomeration theory has been a dominant theory in explaining why firms tend to co-
locate in the same region. The theory argues that firms can increase their profitability by 
locating in the proximity of other economic activities and related production facilities due to 
positive externalities that might stem from industry localization (Marshall, 1920). Several 
studies have shown that agglomeration economies are indeed an important factor in 
explaining foreign multinational location choices (e.g. Belderbos and Carree, 2002, Chang 
and Park, 2005). Marshall (1920) highlighted three positive externalities that favour 
geographic concentration of industries: (1) industry demand that creates a pool of specialized 
labour, (2) industry demand that creates a pool of specialized inputs, and (3) knowledge 
spillovers among firms in an industry. Of all activities in the value chain, R&D activities 
benefit the most from knowledge spillovers among competing firms and consequently show 
the highest level of concentration (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996, McCann and Mudambi, 
2004, Alcácer, 2006). 
Empirical studies have shown that firms can improve their innovative performance by 
benefitting from knowledge spillovers in clusters (e.g. Beaudry and Breschi, 2003), although 
it is worth noting that some studies obtained contrasting or no effects in this regard (e.g. Lee 
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and Lim, 2001). Less attention has been given to the notion that firms not only benefit from 
knowledge spillovers, but that they also contribute to these externalities. Knowledge outflows 
may hinder the firm from appropriating the value from its own inventions. Furthermore, as 
firms are heterogeneous, they will differ in the net benefits they receive from agglomeration 
economies (Chung and Kalnins, 2001, Shaver and Flyer, 2000, Alcácer and Chung, 2013). 
Firms with the best technological capabilities, employees, distributors or suppliers will gain 
little from incoming spillovers, but may competitively suffer when their employees are hired 
by other firms and information on their technologies spills over to competing firms. In this 
context, a number of studies have found that larger or more R&D intensive firms are less 
likely to invest in agglomerated areas  (e.g. Shaver and Flyer, 2000). However, once 
technology leaders have established their R&D facilities, they will have to face the possibility 
that other firms set up new R&D establishments in their vicinity to benefit from knowledge 
spillovers and they cannot easily avoid collocation. This is likely to provide leading firms 
with the incentives to adopt knowledge protection strategies discouraging new R&D 
establishments in their vicinity. 
 
Strategies to prevent knowledge spillovers 
Technology leaders can make use of several strategies to prevent outgoing knowledge 
spillovers from their existing R&D facilities. In general, one can distinguish between two 
types of knowledge protection strategies (de Faria and Sofka, 2010). One type of knowledge 
protection strategies relies on organizational processes within the firm to prevent knowledge 
spillovers, while the other relies on legal forms of protection based on formal applications or 
contracts.  
Firms can adopt specific organizational practices to limit the risk of outgoing 
knowledge spillovers. As most technology leaders are large companies with R&D activities in 
multiple locations, they can take advantage of their geographically dispersed, but closely 
integrated innovation networks. Studies have shown that technology leading firms can make 
use of strong internal linkages across multiple locations to leverage knowledge for 
competitive advantage, without risking critical knowledge outflows to competing firms 
(Alcácer and Zhao, 2012, Feinberg and Gupta, 2004, Zhao and Alcácer, 2007). Feinberg and 
Gupta (2004) for instance documented that firms can minimize outgoing knowledge spillovers 
by integrating their global network of subsidiaries. As specialized complementary assets are 
essential for the commercialization of an invention (Teece, 1986), it follows that competing 
firms that lack such an integration mechanisms are unable to benefit from the incoming 
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knowledge spillovers (Zhao, 2006). Technology leading firms may also reduce outgoing 
knowledge flows by allocating less vulnerable projects to industrial clusters, by incorporating 
local innovation quickly into its global knowledge base and by the use of cross-cluster teams 
to strengthen control over locally developed technologies. The finding by Alcácer and Zhao 
(2012) that firms indeed make use of these mechanisms when they are surrounded by direct 
competitors shows that the internal organization of R&D is often part of a well considered 
strategy to limit outgoing knowledge transfers. Given that these cross-cluster R&D teams can 
be costly to manage (Frost et al., 2002), firms will implement an internal linkage strategy 
when the benefits outweigh the costs, which is more likely under the threat of knowledge 
dissipation. 
Another means to prevent harmful knowledge spillovers is the use of legal instruments 
such as patents and contracts. On the one hand, outgoing knowledge spillovers may be 
difficult to prevent through legal mechanisms, because knowledge spillovers are mostly tacit 
and often occur through interpersonal interactions. On the other hand, studies have 
documented that firms effectively make use of legal instruments aiming to reduce employee 
mobility (Almeida and Kogut, 1999, Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003, Song et al., 2003) and 
that non-compete contracts and employers’ patent litigiousness significantly reduce employee 
mobility (Marx et al., 2009, Agarwal et al., 2009). 
 
Propositions 
 
The extant literature suggests that technology leading firms can effectively use 
mechanisms to prevent outgoing knowledge spillovers. Although prior studies have generally 
seen the presence of technology leading firms as encouraging entry (e.g. Agrawal and 
Cockburn, 2003), we examine whether the presence of regional technology leading firms 
could have a potential entry deterring effect on foreign firms’ R&D location choices. As firms 
take the potential for incoming knowledge spillovers into account when they locate their R&D 
facilities (Chung and Alcácer, 2002a, Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005), they may refrain from 
locating their R&D activities in regions where technology leading firms have incentives to 
prevent outgoing knowledge flows.  
There are various reasons why the actual opportunities to benefit from spillovers may 
be reduced if there is a strong concentration of technology activities in one or a few firms 
(McCann and Mudambi, 2005). Dispersion of R&D activities in a region among a larger 
number of R&D performing firms may fail to provide greater spillovers for prospective 
7 
 
investors even in the absence of specific strategic behaviour to prevent outgoing knowledge 
flows. Chinitz (1961) for instance contended that networking intensity between firms will be 
lower in highly concentrated industry structures. A smaller dispersion of R&D activities will 
also be associated with less diversity and a poorer content of the regional knowledge base 
(Feinberg and Gupta, 2004), rendering a close match between the knowledge generated by 
incumbents and the knowledge base of entrants less likely (Alcácer and Chung, 2013). 
Cantwell and Mudambi (2011) similarly suggest that industrial concentration reflects a 
relative closeness of the local innovation system. Finally, studies in the entrepreneurship 
literature suggest that the dispersion of technology activities among smaller incumbent firms 
might provide greater agglomeration benefits (Chen and Hambrick, 1995, Rosenthal and 
Strange, 2003), as small firms tend to be more open and entrepreneural (Baum and Oliver, 
1991).  
We conclude that there is a range of arguments in prior studies suggesting that 
concentrated technology activities in regions provide fewer knowledge spillover benefits to 
entrants, such that these regions are less likely to attract R&D investments. This leads to the 
following baseline proposition: 
 
Baseline Proposition 1. A high concentration of technology activities in a region among 
incumbent local firms reduces the probability that foreign R&D investors locate in the region. 
 
The negative correlation between concentration of technology ownership and the 
attractiveness of regions for R&D projects may vary, or depend on, the presence of 
technology protection strategies of incumbents. Here we focus on R&D internalization 
strategies used by technology leading firms to prevent valuable knowledge outflows (Zhao, 
2006, Alcácer and Zhao, 2012).1 These strategies imply that firms build on their own internal 
knowledge stock and complementary knowledge assets when developing new technologies. 
By developing technologies that require complementary knowledge and resources which are 
not readily available to potential imitators, technology leading firms can limit valuable 
knowledge outflows, preventing imitation (Teece, 1986, Alcácer and Zhao, 2012). For 
instance, James (2011) finds a negative relationship between the patent self-citation ratio of 
technology leaders and the number of patent applications by competing firms. Alácer and 
Zhao (2012) show that technology leading firms are more often making use of internal 
linkages when they are surrounded by rival firms and suggest that this behavior is part of a 
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strategy to prevent outgoing knowledge flows and to enhance appropriation. Indeed, adoption 
of such strategies was correlated with reduced citations of other firms to the focal firm’s 
patent base. Zhao’s (2006) finding that firms are internalizing their technologies developed in 
countries with weak IPR protection to a greater extent provides additional evidence that this 
internalization is part of a well considered strategy to prevent knowledge expropriation.2 If 
firms succeed in R&D internalization strategies, this can enhance competitive advantage (Hall 
et al., 2003) and increase the firm’s lead-time over competitors (Cohen et al., 2000).  
In summary, R&D internalisation strategies as indicated by the importance of intra-
firm knowledge flows, are expected to reduced knowledge spillovers. As investing firms take 
the potential for incoming spillovers into account when they decide on the location of their 
foreign R&D activities, it follows that firms are discouraged to enter regions in which the 
leading firm adopted such strategies: 
Proposition 2. A strong degree of internalization of technology development activities by 
local technology leaders reduces the probability that foreign R&D investors locate in the 
region. 
 
Regional technology leaders are often multinational firms operating multiple dispersed R&D 
facilities across a variety of countries. This allows them to assimilate, generate and integrate 
knowledge on a worldwide basis (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990, Frost et al., 2002). It also offers 
the opportunity to internalize knowledge flows across borders (e.g. Zhao, 2006). When 
technology leaders develop inventions that build upon prior internally developed technologies 
in R&D facilities abroad, this may present additional difficulties for competing firms to 
benefit from these leading firms’ local R&D activities. Competing firms that seek to benefit 
from knowledge outflows and imitation strategies will face much greater difficulties to obtain 
needed complementary knowledge residing in several locations across national borders. This 
presents a much greater challenge than in case leading firms’ internalization strategies are 
restricted to internal development of technologies in the same location. This leads to the next 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 3. A strong degree of cross-border internalization of technology development 
activities by local technology leaders reduces the probability that foreign R&D investors 
locate in the region - more so than internalization strategies restricted to domestic technology 
development activities. 
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DATA, VARIABLES and METHOD 
We obtained information on cross-border R&D investments from the Financial Times’ 
Cross-border Investment Monitor database for the years 2003 through 2008. This database is 
developed by the Financial Times Ltd and tracks global cross border investments drawing on 
public information sources and information from local and national investment agencies.  It 
includes information on the investing firms, the city and country of investment, the sector of 
investment and the type of activity (R&D, manufacturing, logistics, distribution, etc.). For our 
purpose we only retrieved information on R&D projects located in EU-15 countries. Due to 
the limited availability of regional information required to construct our independent 
variables, in particular regional R&D intensity, our sample for analysis consists of 301 R&D 
investments made by 218 firms.3 From among these projects, we selected those for which the 
detailed press releases and company reports suggested that the mandate of the project 
extended to research. For these projects we can be sure that knowledge spillovers and 
knowledge sourcing are important, while projects focusing solely on development often imply 
limited activities focusing on application of technologies in the local context or design 
activities. Consequently, we focus on a sample of 196 R&D investments by 152 firms.4 Firms 
based in the US were responsible for the largest share of R&D projects (49%), followed by 
firms based in the UK (8%), France (8%), Germany (7%) and Japan (6%). Based on the 
information on the industry of the investment project we categorized the projects in twelve 2-
digit NACE manufacturing industries, for which we can also construct measures of industry-
specific patent activity (see below). We complemented this dataset with information about the 
characteristics of the NUTS-1 regions in EU-15 countries using various data sources.  
 
Dependent variable  
The dependent variable is a binary variable, which indicates in which NUTS-1 region 
in the EU-15 the R&D investment is made. This variable takes the value one if a foreign firm 
made its R&D investment in host region j and zero otherwise. Our analysis includes 64 
NUTS-1 regions.5 Table 1 shows the distribution of R&D projects over industries. Most of 
R&D investments are made in the electronics and pharmaceutical industries with respectively 
40 and 38 percent of the R&D investments. The chemicals, transport and machinery industries 
are each responsible for about 5 percent of the investments, while the remaining industries are 
less well represented. No cross-border R&D investments are reported for the textiles, paper 
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and mineral industries. Table 2 shows the distribution of the projects over NUTS-1 regions. 
From the table, we can observe that most R&D investments are made in Catalunya (ES5) and 
Ireland (IE0) with respectively 23 and 21 R&D projects. 
 
INSERT TABLES 1 and 2  
 
Technology concentration 
To measure the level of concentration of technology development activities among 
firms based in the region, we calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of company patent 
ownership.6 This technology concentration index measures the concentration of patents 
among firms applied for by inventors based in the region and relevant to the industry. It is the 
sum of squares of the patent shares of individual firms with patents invented in the region and 
ranges between just over zero (highly dispersed activities) to 1 (one company is responsible 
for all the region’s relevant patents). We use patent information from the European patent 
office to characterize technology concentration and technological strength (see below) 
because the advantages of patent data are given by their consistent availability over time and 
their detailed information on technological content and location of inventive activity 
(Griliches, 1998). Patent data have been very frequently used in prior research on 
international R&D and as indicator of innovative activities (Belderbos, 2001, Cantwell and 
Piscitello, 2005, Allred and Park, 2007).  
Patents are assigned to NUTS-1 regions based on the addresses of the inventors that 
are listed on the patents (Deyle and Grupp, 2005). In order to allocate patents to industries, we 
make use of the patent technology class to industry concordance table developed by Schmoch 
et al. (2003). This concordance table links the technology codes (IPC) of the patents to their 
corresponding NACE code at the two-digit level. If a patent lists multiple inventors and IPC 
classes, we use fractional counts to assign the patent to the region and industry. Patents are 
allocated to firms at the consolidated level including firm’s majority-owned subsidiaries. 
As these data operations, which we had to implement across regions and industries, 
are likely to introduce measurement error in the data, we used a dummy variable indicating 
whether the region is characterized by an above or below the median Herfindhal-Hirschman 
index rather than the detailed index itself. The dummy variable high technology concentration 
takes the value one if patent ownership in the industry and region is highly concentrated. 
Proposition 1 suggested that this variable has a negative effect on R&D location choice.  
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Internalisation (patent self-citations) 
To measure the internalization strategy of the regional technology leader, we calculated 
the patent self-citation ratio of this leader in the year prior to the investment. The 
technological leader is the firm that applied for the most patents in the NUTS-1 region and 
sector of the investing firm. The self-citation ratio is a measure of intra-firm knowledge 
transfers and represents the extent to which firms retain the value of R&D within internal 
boundaries (James and Shaver, 2008, Zhao, 2006, Trajtenberg et al., 1997, Hall et al., 2001, 
Hall et al., 2003). The self-citation ratio is measured as the ratio of self-citations over total 
citations of a leading firm’s patents invented in the region and related to the focal industry. A 
citation is considered a self-citation if the citing and cited patents are both assigned to the 
same firm (at the consolidated level).  
We constructed three dummy variables indicating combinations of technology 
concentration and internalization. One dummy takes the value one if the region shows a 
strong (above median) technology concentration and if the technology leading firm is strongly 
internalizing its knowledge (the technology leader has an above median self-citation ratio). A 
second dummy variable takes the value 1 if the region exhibits strong technology 
concentration but when the technology leading firm is not strongly internalizing its 
knowledge flows (the firm has a below the median self-citation ratio). A third dummy 
variable takes the value 1 in case of weak technology concentration combined with strong 
internalization. The omitted reference dummy is the situation where there is neither strong 
technology concentration nor strong internalization. Proposition 2 suggests the strongest 
negative effect of the combination of high concentration and high internalization: strong local 
technology leaders with pronounced internalization strategies. 
To test whether cross-border internalization strategies have a stronger effect than 
domestic internalization, we calculated cross-border and domestic self-citation ratios 
separately, by identifying the country of the inventors of the cited patents. The foreign self-
citation ratio is measured as the ratio of foreign self-citations over total citations of a leading 
firm’s patents in the region and sector. The domestic self-citation ratio is calculated in a 
similar way by dividing domestic self-citations by total citations of all patents of the 
technology leader in the region and sector. Based on these ratios and the dummy variable 
identifying high technology concentration, we constructed 7 combined dummy variables to 
examine what the roles are of technology concentration, domestic self-citations and foreign 
self-citations in discouraging R&D. The reference category is the case where a low 
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technology concentration is combined with a low domestic and a low foreign self-citation 
ratio. Proposition 3 suggests a the strongest negative effects in case of high technology 
concentration combined with a high foreign self-citation ratio, but less so for combinations of 
high concentration and high domestic self-citations.  
Table 3 shows examples of regions with high technology concentration and high 
(foreign) self-citation ratios. Technology leaders are often large multinationals firms such as 
Bayer, Philips, Shell and Monsanto. These firms have large R&D budgets and operate R&D 
affiliates across many countries, opening up opportunities to internalize (cross-border) 
knowledge flows, which are reflected in high self-citation ratios. Still, there is ample 
heterogeneity in the intensity of self citations, with, for example, AstraZeneca showing 
stronger internalization strategies than Bayer in the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Other explanatory variables 
As control variables we included a range of host region characteristics that have been 
found to influence R&D location choices in prior studies. As not all location factors differ 
within a country across regions, or are available at the regional level, we also include a 
number of host country characteristics in addition to a full set of host country dummies.  
The presence of clustered technology activities, proxied by patent activity, has been 
found to attract R&D investments in earlier studies (e.g. Belderbos et al., 2009). We include 
the variable technological strength, which is the share of the region in the number of patent 
applications in the EU-15 allocated to the industry of the investing firms. It measures the 
availability of technological knowledge and potential R&D spillovers relevant for the 
industry. By constructing this variable at the industry level, we control for differences in the 
propensity to patent across industries. In addition, we control for differences in patent quality 
across regions. The number of citations a patent receives (forward citations) mirrors the 
technological importance of the patent for the development of subsequent technologies and 
also reflects the economic value of inventions (Trajtenberg, 1990, Hall et al., 2005, Harhoff et 
al., 2003). We collected forward citations received by the regional patents at the patent family 
level and constructed patent quality as the average number of forward citations received by 
regional patents in an industry in the year prior to investment.7 We also include the backward 
citation intensity of patents invented in the region to control for general characteristics of 
technology development in the region. This variable is measured as the average number of 
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backward citations on patents in the NUTS-1 region and industry. Several studies have 
suggested that this backward citation frequency is an indicator of patent impact, as inventions 
using a wider array of prior art tend to be more valuable (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). 
Finally, we include the R&D intensity of the host region (Shimizutani and Todo, 2008) to 
control for R&D spillovers at the broader regional level. This variable is the ratio of the total 
intramural R&D expenditure in the business sector of the host region over total GDP of that 
region.   
Several studies have also found that academic research has a positive impact on the 
innovative performance of firms (e.g. Cohen et al., 2002, Fleming and Sorenson, 2004, 
Mansfield, 1995). As research has shown that these effects are highly localized (e.g. Del 
Barrio-Castro and García-Quevedo, 2005, Piergiovanni and Santarelli, 2001), firms may 
locate in the close vicinity of academic research institutions. We include the variable 
academic research strength, which is the share of the region in the number of university 
publications in the EU-15 allocated to the industry of the investing firms. We counted 
university publications at the level of regions and science fields and measure relevant 
publications for investing firms by linking science fields to the industry that firms are active 
in (Belderbos et al., 2009).  
The likelihood that a host region attracts foreign R&D investments may also rise due 
to market size and market sophistication (Barrell and Pain, 1996). We include the region’s 
population and GDP per capita to account for respectively the market size and regional 
purchasing power and market sophistication. We also include the regional unemployment rate 
as general labour availability can be an important factor in the decision to invest in a region 
(Friedman et al., 1992). Airport traffic measures the total passengers embarked and 
disembarked on regional airports and is a measure of transportation infrastructure and 
regional connectivity, which may be particularly important for multinational firms (Bel and 
Fageda, 2008).  
The models also include a number of investor-related characteristics. We include 
dummy variables taking the value one if the firm had previously located an R&D investment 
in the region, or a non-R&D related investment, respectively. Manufacturing and sales 
investments often are a precursor to R&D investments to adapt processes and products to the 
local market (e.g. Belderbos, 2003), while prior R&D may lead to intra-firm collocation 
advantages. The geographical distance between the source city of the investing firm and the 
NUTS-1 region is included as a larger distance between the source and destination country 
can impede R&D investments due to increased informational uncertainty and coordination 
14 
 
costs (Ghemawat, 2001, Castellani et al., 2011). Language similarity has also been shown to 
be an important factor for foreign R&D investments because it enables a smooth 
communication and coordination, lowering transaction costs (Hejazi and Safarian, 2002). We 
include a dummy variable that equals 1 if the source city and NUTS-1 region share the same 
official language.  
In addition to host country dummies, the analysis includes two variables at the host 
country level. The wage costs of skilled R&D personnel (Belderbos et al., 2009, Kumar, 
2001) is measured at the country level, as data at the regional level are not available. We use 
data on average gross annual earning of qualified engineers drawing on UBS Price & Earning 
reports. The b-index is a measure for the tax pressure on R&D activities (Warda, 2006). The 
higher this b-index, the less generous the tax treatment of R&D is in a particular country and 
the less attractive the country’s regions might be for R&D investments.  
To reduce variance we transformed all variables (except the binary variables) by 
taking their natural logarithm. All variables are lagged by one year with respect to the year of 
investment to allow a response time by the investing firms and to reflect the proper time-
ordering.  Definitions and summary statistics of the variables are provided in table 4 and the 
correlation table is available upon request.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
Methods 
Within the location choice literature (e.g. Alcácer and Chung, 2007, Head et al., 
1995), the conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974) has been widely used to analyze the 
location determinants of foreign direct investments. A drawback of this model is the 
restrictive assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This property states 
that for any two alternatives the ratio of probabilities is independent of the characteristics of 
any other alternative in the choice set. Accordingly the relative probability of any two 
alternatives is independent of the inclusion or removal of other alternatives. This 
characteristic also implies the absence of correlations between error terms across alternatives. 
This assumption is however frequently violated in location choice analyses. Recent studies 
(e.g. Basile et al., 2008, Chung and Alcácer, 2002a) have therefore used the mixed logit 
model, which does not rely on the IIA assumption (McFadden and Train, 2000). As Hausman 
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tests showed that this assumption was also violated in our sample, we likewise use mixed 
logit models. 
These models start from a random utility maximization setting to examine location 
choices of R&D investments. Having a choice set of alternative host regions r = 1,… R to 
locate an overseas R&D project at time t, a multinational firm f seeks to maximize its 
expected utility (Ufr,t) as a function of observable regional attributes and unobservable 
regional factors εfr. The expected utility of a multinational firm f choosing region r among 
other host regions at time t can be expressed by the function: 
fr,t fr,t-1 frU = αX +ε           (1) 
In this function, Xfr, t-1 represents a vector of region-specific characteristics that can 
vary across industries or firms, while εfr defines a region-specific independent random 
disturbance term. While the standard conditional logit model restricts the coefficients α to be 
equal across firms, the mixed logit allows the coefficients to be normally distributed. 
Accordingly, coefficients are decomposed into a fixed part and a random part that accounts 
for unobservable effects. The error term incorporates the random components of the 
coefficients and takes the following form: 
fr = f fr,t-1 frε λ Ζ +μ          (2) 
where Zfr,t-1 is a vector of observable variables while λf is a vector of randomly 
distributed parameters with zero mean following a normal distribution with variance Ω. The 
parameter μfr is an independent and identically distributed error term. If the parameter λf 
would be observed, the probability that a firm f would locate its foreign R&D investment in 
city r could be expressed as a standard logit model. However, since the coefficients in the 
mixed logit model are not known but are assumed to follow a certain density function g(λf), 
the locational choice probability has to be calculated over all possible values of λf. The mixed 
logit probability is therefore obtained by taking the integral of the multiplication of the 
conditional probability with the density functions describing the random nature of the 
coefficients. This is described by the following equation:  
fr,t-1 f fr,t-1
fr f fJ
fj,t-1 f fj,t-1
j=1
exp(αX +λ Ζ )P = g(λ )d(λ )
exp(αX +λ Ζ )∫ ∑      (3) 
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The mixed logit probability is essentially a weighted average of the logit formula 
evaluated at different values of the betas, where the weights are provided by the density 
function. We follow the most general approach by allowing a continuous distribution function 
(Chung and Alcácer, 2002c, Basile et al., 2008, Belderbos et al., 2014b). As there is no closed 
form solution for the mixed logit probability, it has to be approximated by simulation 
techniques. The estimation of mixed logic models requires an assumption about the precise 
distribution function of the coefficients. Our models are estimated under the assumption of a 
normal distribution – the distribution most commonly adopted as it has the most general 
properties. Other functional forms have less desirable properties or poor convergence levels 
(Train, 2003). We have run all our regressions with 100 simulation draws (Revelt & Train, 
1998; Train, 2003). 
The random parameters in our regressions accommodate a rich array of differential 
preferences on the part of investors, while they also form the basis for accommodating 
correlations across alternative locations (a feature causing biased estimates in conditional logit 
models). Because we have no a priori expectations about whether certain variables should 
have a random component or not, we allowed the maximum number of variables to have both 
a fixed and a random component (Chung and Alcácer, 2002c, Basile et al., 2008, Revelt and 
Train, 1998).8, 9   
We note that our empirical model includes variables with different characteristic types. 
The sample includes a number of variables that vary over regions and time (e.g. GDP/cap, 
population), while there are also time-variant industry-specific variables at the region level 
(e.g. technological strength, academic research strength). Yet other factors are firm- and 
region-specific but remain constant over time (such as language similarity and geographic 
distance), while the variables firm’s previous investments and previous R&D vary by 
investing firm, region and time. Finally, our sample includes also two variables that were only 
available at the country level: wage cost and the b-index.   
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Results of the mixed logit models are reported in Table 5. Model 1 includes the 
control variables only, while model 2 adds the technology concentration dummy (proposition 
1). In model 3, three dummy variables are added to examine whether the internalization 
strategy of the technology leading firm of the region significantly deters R&D investments 
(proposition 2). Finally, Model 4 introduces 7 dummy variables to test whether cross-border 
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internal linkages are more effectively discouraging R&D than domestic internal linkages 
(proposition 3). 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
Most of the control variables have the expected sign. The technological strength of the NUTS-
1 regions has a significantly positive influence on the propensity to locate R&D investments 
in a region. Patent quality also matters: its coefficient is always positive and turns significant 
in the more encompassing models 3 and 4. Other significant influences are language 
similarity, airport infrastructure, the unemployment rate and firm’s previous R&D 
investments. The large coefficient of previous R&D investments shows that multinational 
firms have a clear tendency to invest in regions where they are already present. This points to 
the importance of internal agglomeration and collocation forces as documented in prior 
studies (Defever, 2006, Alcacer and Delgado, 2013). Examining our data in detail, we observe 
that there are 8 firms that make multiple, consecutive, investments in the same region. Hence, 
while collocation effects are strong and predict follow-up investments, in our sample this 
phenomenon is not widespread. From the table, we can observe two rather unexpected 
findings. One unexpected finding is the significantly negative effect of regional GDP per 
capita.  This negative effect may be caused by a potentially high correlation with an omitted 
variable in the model: regional wage costs. As wage costs have a negative impact on R&D 
location decisions, the correlated variable GDP per capita might absorb part of this effect. 
Due to the unavailability of data, we were however not able to include regional wage 
variables in our empirical models and instead relied on the inclusion of wage costs at the 
national level. Another surprising result is the insignificance of academic research strength - 
although its sign is positive, as expected. We experimented with another proxy to control for 
the effect of academic research by creating a variable that counts the number of top-500 
universities present in the host region, but this variable was similarly insignificant. Part of the 
explanation may be sought in our restricted sample of regions to those that exhibit patented 
inventions. As this restriction tends to eliminate regions with poorly developed academic 
infrastructure, the variation in the academic research variable is substantially reduced. In 
addition, our data requirements and focus limited the time frame of analysis and number of 
investments that we could cover in the analysis, in comparison with other location studies 
(e.g. Belderbos et al., 2014). 
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In model 2 we observe that the technology concentration dummy is significantly 
negative (at the 10 percent level), while the other coefficients are not strongly affected. A high 
technology concentration of technology development activities in a region reduces the 
probability that foreign R&D investors locate in that region, in support of proposition 1. In 
model 3 only the coefficient on the dummy representing regions with both high technology 
concentration and high internalization is significantly negative, while the other two dummies 
are not significant. This suggests that it is not the concentration as such that distracts 
investments, but concentration accompanied with a strong internal orientation of R&D by the 
regional technology leading firm, in support of proposition 2.  
Finally, Model 4 introduces 7 dummy variables to compare the effects of cross-
border and domestic knowledge internalization. The reference category is low technology 
concentration in combination with low domestic and low cross-border internalization. The 
two significantly negative coefficients for regions with high technology concentration 
combined with high cross-border internalization (with or without high domestic 
internalization) clearly suggest that foreign R&D investors are deterred from investing in 
regions where technology leaders follow internalization strategies drawing on cross-border 
knowledge flows. These patterns suggest that it is cross-border internalisation, rather than 
domestic internalization, that discourages investment, consistent with proposition 3.  
Among the random terms of the coefficients, R&D intensity, population, firm’s 
previous investments, geographic distance, wage cost and the b-index are significant, as well 
as 3 dummy variables testing our propositions. This indicates that there is unspecified 
heterogeneity in preferences for different sets of regions and among investors, which will lead 
to a violation of the IIA in standard conditional logit models. Likelihood ratio tests comparing 
our models with models having only fixed coefficients also show that these models are 
significantly different from each other, which underscores the need to utilize mixed logit 
models. Although it is difficult to assess what the underlying causes are of the observed 
heterogeneity in the effects of the independent variables we note that the findings are broadly 
consistent with previous location studies discussing heterogeneity in the valuation location 
specific characteristics. For instance, Basile et al. (2008) finds variance in the importance of 
population, R&D intensity, wage costs, firm prior experience and distance; Chung and 
Alcacer (2002) emphasize the varying importance of R&D intensity. Variance in coefficients 
related to our patent variables (e.g. patent quality) may be due to different unobserved 
underlying entry motivations, e.g. a sole emphasis on knowledge sourcing and quality of the 
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local innovation system, versus an emphasis on R&D to facilitate access to the local and 
national market. 
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Our measure of knowledge internalization strategies could be correlated with broader 
strategic behaviour by technology leaders to reduce knowledge outflows. High self-citation 
ratios are usually correlated with a low external collaboration intensity, as firms engaged in 
collaboration networks or alliances share more knowledge compared to non-allying firms 
(Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006). To explore this, we included an imperfect proxy for external 
R&D collaboration by the leading firms. As indicator of collaboration, we used the share of 
co-patents in the leading firm’s regional patents. We note that this variable is rather imperfect, 
as only a fraction of R&D collaboration activities will eventually lead to co-patents, given the 
complex property rights implications of shared patent rights (Belderbos et al., 2014a). We 
found that the co-patent ratio was (weakly) negatively related to the self-citation ratio, as 
expected. Including the variable in the regressions resulted in a positive sign, but the 
coefficient was not significantly different from zero.  
In another explorative analysis, we investigated potential investor heterogeneity by 
excluding investing firms holding large patent portfolios and planning large R&D 
investments: in these cases it may be that investing firms are similarly afraid of generating 
outgoing spillovers to local firms (e.g. Alcácer and Chung, 2013), and local leaders’ strategies 
might become less relevant. The resulting models however did not identify a clear difference 
for the sample cleaned of such ‘leading investors’. Similarly, subsample analysis of 
investment projects limited to knowledge intensive industries did not indicate stronger effects 
of knowledge sourcing related variables, with the exception of large coefficients for 
technological strength. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
If firms take the potential for incoming knowledge spillovers into account when they 
decide on the location of new R&D facilities (e.g. Aharonson et al., 2007, Chung and Alcácer, 
2002a), they may refrain from locating their R&D activities in regions where incumbent firms 
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are making use of mechanisms to prevent outgoing knowledge flows. Leading technology 
firms in particular may have incentives to prevent knowledge spillovers, including those to 
new entrants, as they have most to lose from outgoing spillovers and have relatively less to 
gain from incoming knowledge. One way to mitigate risks of outgoing spillovers is to adjust 
the internal organization of R&D activities by focusing on knowledge internalization, with 
new technology development drawing on technological knowledge available within the firm’s 
boundaries (Alcácer and Zhao, 2012). In particular if technology development rests on 
complementary knowledge residing in several R&D locations across national borders, 
collocated firms are likely to have fewer opportunities to benefit from leading firms’ local 
R&D efforts (Zhao, 2006). This implies that concentration of technology development 
activities in a region in leading firms that follow R&D internalization strategies may reduce 
the probability that foreign R&D investors locate in the region.  
We find support for this notion that technology leaders discourage inward R&D 
investments in an analysis of the location of 196 foreign R&D investment projects drawing on 
data provided by the Financial Times' Cross-border Investment Monitor (2003-2008). We 
analyze firms' location choices at the regional (NUTS-1) level and identify the strength of 
industry technology leaders as dominant players in regional R&D from the concentration of 
regional patenting activity among local firms. We analyze investment locations and the 
relationship with technology clusters and technology leaders at the relevant industry level, and 
consider R&D investment projects across manufacturing industries. Our results show that, 
while the strength and quality of local relevant technology development attracts R&D projects 
by foreign firms, investors are discouraged by a concentration of technology development 
activities among regional industry leaders. We show that this effects depends on  the strategy 
of leading local firms to internalize technology development activities (measured by the 
intensity of self-citations on firms’ patents) By developing technologies that build upon 
internal knowledge stocks and that require complementary knowledge and resources which 
are not readily available to potential imitators, knowledge dissipation to, and imitation by, 
other firms remains limited (Teece, 1986, Feinberg and Gupta, 2004). Consequently, these 
internalization mechanisms allow the technology leading firm to minimize outgoing 
knowledge spillovers that could endanger its competitive position (Alcácer and Zhao, 2012). 
We find that internalization strategies focusing on intra-firm cross-border knowledge flows 
with R&D units abroad have a much stronger discouraging effect on inward R&D than 
domestic internal linkages. Cross-border integration of technology development is a greater 
impediment to knowledge spillovers to investing firms as effective knowledge sourcing may 
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require these firms to combine their investment with complementary R&D activities of their 
own in other locations.  
Our findings contribute to the literature on agglomeration and location decisions 
(Shaver and Flyer, 2000, Chung and Alcácer, 2002b, Alcácer and Chung, 2007), by focusing 
on the role of incumbent strategies to avoid outgoing spillovers, which has not received due 
attention. We contribute to a stream of research suggesting that concentration of ownership of 
local resources may render locations less attractive (e.g. Cantwell and Mudambi, 2011; 
Alcacer and Chung, 2013) by highlighting that the presence of dominant firms in local R&D 
clusters discourages entry primarily if this dominance is accompanied by R&D organizational 
strategies to prevent knowledge spillovers. In this manner, our results challenge the common 
premise in the literature on clusters (e.g. Storper, 1995, Porter, 2000, Cooke, 2001) that firms 
will generally benefit from knowledge spillovers when locating in regions with clustered 
industrial activity, and call for future research investigating more detailed properties of 
regional innovation systems as antecedents of or impediments to such knowledge spillovers.  
Our results suggest that the presence of ‘regional champions’ or ‘anchor firms’, while 
increasing innovation activities and output in a region (Agrawal and Cockburn, 2003, 
Feldman, 2003), at the same time may discourage inward R&D investments in the region. If 
the leading firms organize their internal R&D to prevent knowledge spillovers, this can have 
detrimental effects for technology development in the region and accordingly has important 
consequences for regional innovation policies. Limited knowledge spillovers to other firms in 
the region will limit agglomeration benefits and positive externalities, potentially reducing 
knowledge accumulation and economic growth (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996, Martin and 
Ottaviano, 1999, Baldwin and Martin, 2004). At the same time, it reduces inward R&D 
investments, and policies to attract inward R&D competition may prove to be less effective. 
This suggests the importance of implementing policies to promote more open innovation 
strategies by local technology leaders. There are several ways to promote knowledge 
diffusion. Policy makers can take measures to improve local labour mobility and stimulate 
spin-offs and other open innovation initiatives, as these are major mechanisms to increase 
knowledge spillovers (Almeida and Kogut, 1999, Capello, 1999, Capello and Faggian, 2005). 
A useful instrument may be targeted R&D subsidies that require collaboration with other 
firms, as R&D collaboration may alter the R&D internalization strategies and generate 
broader spillovers to collaboration partners (e.g. Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006, Autant-Bernard 
et al., 2007).  
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We note a number of limitations of our study, which could provide avenues for further 
research. First, our analysis could only take into account knowledge protection strategies 
through internal R&D organization. To the extent that incumbent firms may use a range of 
protection strategies simultaneously (e.g. patent litigation strategies and non-compete clauses) 
our findings on the importance of internalization strategies may partially pick up the effect of 
correlated protection strategies. Future work should aim to analyze the effects of multiple 
knowledge protection strategies. A stumbling block will be the lack of available data at the 
regional or firm level, for instance on labour mobility and non-compete clauses.  
Second, we focused research on ‘horizontal’ knowledge spillovers due to agglomeration of 
firms in the same industry. Future studies should take the role of spillovers from upstream 
(suppliers) or downstream (customers) simultaneously into account. Most studies examining 
supplier and customer spillovers (Fritsch and Franke, 2004, Klomp and Van Leeuwen, 2001, 
Tether, 2002) have relied on survey data, and the challenge will be to extend analysis in a 
representative manner to the level of regions and industries across countries.  
Third, our analysis used a relatively broad spatial disaggregation of European countries 
into regions, at the NUTS-1 level. NUTS-1 regions correspond with areas of between 3 and 7 
million inhabitants and might not be necessarily capturing the most relevant R&D clusters. 
The lack of a regional delineation based on economic areas is a general problem of analysing 
regional development in Europe, where one has to work with existing regional administrative 
definitions (Tappeiner et al., 2008, Bottazzi and Peri, 2003, Maurseth and Verspagen, 2002). 
Although the literature on knowledge spillovers suggests that spillovers decay rapidly at 
distance (e.g. Autant-Bernard, 2001, Belenzon and Schankerman, 2012, Jaffe et al., 1993), the 
available estimates of decay functions do not directly suggest that NUTS-1 regions are 
particularly large in this respect. Estimates of the distance at which knowledge spillovers 
become less salient range from 250-300 km (Belenzon and Schankerman, 2012, Criscuolo 
and Verspagen, 2008, Maurseth and Verspagen, 2002) to 200 km (Bottazzi and Peri, 2003), 
which compares well with the feature that the large majority of NUTS-1 regions have a radius 
smaller than 150 km.10 Neverthelesss, a future challenge for research clearly is to work with 
‘economic areas’ in Europe based on actual agglomeration and commuting patterns. 
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NOTES 
1. We limit our analysis to strategies related to R&D organization within the leading firms, as 
strategies based on legal forms of protections (e.g. employment contracts and non-disclosure 
agreements) are difficult to identify.  
2. Self-citations indicate the extent to which firms build on their own prior technology development 
efforts in developing new inventions. It is a measure of intra-firm knowledge transfer and 
represents the extent to which firms retain the value of R&D within internal boundaries (James and 
Shaver, 2008, Zhao, 2006, Trajtenberg et al., 1997). 
3. Some variables (such as R&D Intensity) are not consistently reported by EUROSTAT for a number 
of countries across years, such that we had to omit a number of region-years observations. This 
included the years 2003, 2005, and 2007 for Germany and the years 2006, 2007, and 2008 for 
France. Greece is missing due to lack of information on a range of regional characteristics, but 
Greece did not receive R&D investments during the period of observation. Since (apart from 
Greece) all host countries remain in the dataset and the omission of specific years is not systematic, 
this forced attrition of the sample is unlikely to lead to estimation bias. The models also exclude 
regions and industry combinations for which no company patents are recorded, as for these regions 
the key explanatory variables related to technology concentration and internalization cannot be 
calculated. Regions without any company patents are typically smaller regions in less patent 
intensive industries. We confirmed that this sample attrition had no appreciable impact on the 
results by exploring models setting the concentration and internalization variables to zero in case 
the region has no patented inventions. 
4. In a robustness tests we included development projects. This produced similar, though less 
pronounced empirical results. 
5. In case the investing firm is based in an EU-15 country, the regions in their home country are 
omitted from the choice set. As our FDI data only cover cross-border investments, R&D 
investments in the home country are not observed by definition. 
6. We excluded patents owned by individuals, universities, hospitals, governmental non-profit 
organizations. 
7. Due to the truncation of patents in the most recent years and for consistency, we limited the 
window of forward citations to 2 years. 
8. As the statistical program we use (the mixlogit command in STATA) only allows 20 random 
variables, we assumed non-random coefficients for two (control) variables. We chose two control 
variables with insignificant random parameters and for which preference heterogeneity ex ante was 
less likely as fixed: Previous R&D and Airport traffic. Alternative settings for non-random 
coefficients produced consistent results. 
9.  We note the caveat that significance tests for variances of random components have to be 
interpreted with caution as they test against a value (zero) that is on the boundary of the parameter 
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space (Stram and Lee, 1994). This feature does not affect the advantages of the mixed logit model 
in providing unbiased estimates, relaxing the IIA assumption and allowing for heterogeneous 
preferences. 
10. Other regions such as Catalunya are larger. We experimented with omitting these larger regions 
from the analysis and obtained comparable results. 
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Table 1: Cross-border R&D investments by industry, 2003-2008 
Industry Frequency Percentage 
Food 4 2.0 
Textiles 0 0 
Paper 0 0 
Chemicals 9 4.6 
Pharmaceuticals 75 38.3 
Rubber 5 2.6 
Minerals 0 0 
Metals 2 1.0 
Machinery 10 5.1 
Electronics 78 40.0 
Transport 10 5.1 
Others 3 1.5 
Total 196 100 
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Table 2: Distribution of Cross border R&D investments over NUTS-1 regions, 2003-2008 
NUTS-1 region Frequency Percentage 
 
NUTS-1 region Frequency Percentage 
Catalunya (ES5) 23 11.73 
 
Baden-Württemberg (DE1) 2 1.02 
Ireland (IE0) 21 10.71 
 
Bayern (DE2) 2 1.02 
East of England (UKH) 14 7.14 
 
Berlin (DE3) 2 1.02 
Flanders (FL) 11 5.61 
 
Nordrhein-Westfalen (DEA) 2 1.02 
South East England (UKJ) 9 4.59 
 
Sachsen (DED) 2 1.02 
Scotland (UKM) 9 4.59 
 
North East Spain (ES2) 2 1.02 
Denmark (DK0) 8 4.08 
 
South Spain (ES6) 2 1.02 
Comunidad de Madrid (ES3) 8 4.08 
 
Finland (FI1) 2 1.02 
Northern Ireland (UKN) 7 3.57 
 
Central France (FR7) 2 1.02 
Méditeranée (FR8) 6 3.06 
 
North East England (UKC) 2 1.02 
Bassin Parisien (FR2) 5 2.55 
 
London (UKI) 2 1.02 
North West Italy (ITC) 5 2.55 
 
Wales (UKL) 2 1.02 
Portugal (PT1) 5 2.55 
 
Hamburg (DE6) 1 0.51 
East Sweden (SE1) 5 2.55 
 
South West France (FR6) 1 0.51 
Île de France (FR1) 4 2.04 
 
Isole (ITG) 1 0.51 
Central Italy (ITE) 4 2.04 
 
Luxembourg (LU0) 1 0.51 
Walloon Region (BE3) 3 1.53 
 
West Netherlands (NL3) 1 0.51 
East France (FR4) 3 1.53 
 
South Netherlands (NL4) 1 0.51 
West France (FR5) 3 1.53 
 
South Sweden (SE2) 1 0.51 
South West England (UKK) 3 1.53 
 
North Sweden (SE3) 1 0.51 
East Austria (AT1) 2 1.02 
 
North West England (UKD) 1 0.51 
South Austria (AT2) 2 1.02 
 
West Midlands (UKG) 1 0.51 
West Austria (AT3) 2 1.02 
 
Total 196 100 
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Table 3: Regional Technology leaders in selected regions with above median technology concentration and leader's self-citation ratio 
NUTS-1 region Industry HH-index Technology leader Self-citation ratio 
Foreign 
Self-citation ratio 
Walloon Region (BE3) Food 1.00 Monsanto 1.00 1.00 
Nordrhein-Westfalen (DEA) Food 0.82 Bayer 1.00 0.33 
Rheinland-Pfalz (DEB) Chemicals 0.97 Basf 0.47 0.26 
West Netherlands (NL3) Chemicals 0.93 Shell 0.60 0.40 
Thüringen (DEG) Pharmaceuticals 1.00 Bayer 0.53 0.27 
North West England (UKD) Pharmaceuticals 0.99 Astrazeneca 0.73 0.73 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais (FR3) Rubber 1.00 Nexans 1.00 1.00 
Walloon Region (BE3) Rubber 1.00 Total 0.67 0.50 
Catalunya (ES5) Metals 0.50 Sandvik 1.00 1.00 
Berlin (DE3) Metals 0.63 Siemens 0.78 0.67 
Portugal (PT1) Machinery 0.81 Bosch 0.57 0.57 
East Midlands (UKF) Machinery 1.00 Siemens 0.41 0.41 
Isole (ITG) Electronics 1.00 STMicroelectronics 0.53 0.41 
South Netherlands (NL4) Electronics 0.95 Philips 0.52 0.39 
South Sweden (SE2) Transport 1.00 Ford 0.60 0.40 
East of England (UKH) Transport 0.78 Nissan 0.80 0.80 
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Table 4: Definition and summary statistics of explanatory variables 
Name  Definition Mean Stdev. 
Technological Strength Logarithm of (1 + share of the NUTS-1 region in EU15 patent applications * 100) (at industry level) 2.31 1.10 
Academic Research Strength Logarithm of (1 + share of the NUTS-1 region in EU15 university publications * 100) (at industry level) 3.20 0.96 
R&D Intensity Logarithm of  (total intramural R&D expenditures in business sector of NUTS-1 region / GDP of NUTS-1 region)  0.70 0.35 
Patent quality  Logarithm of average number of forward citations per patent in NUTS-1 region (at industry level) 0.64 0.48 
Backward citation intensity Logarithm of average number of  citations per patent  in NUTS-1 region (at industry level) 0.45 0.38 
GDP Per Capita Logarithm of GDP per capita of NUTS-1 region 3.26 0.27 
Population Logarithm of population (1000) of NUTS-1 region 8.53 0.65 
Firm’s Previous Investments Dummy variable indicating whether the investing company has previous manufacturing investments in the NUTS-1 region 0.03 0.18 
Firm’s Previous R&D Dummy variable indicating whether the investing company has previous R&D investments in the NUTS-1 region 0.00 0.03 
Unemployment Rate Logarithm of unemployment rate of  NUTS-1 region 1.96 0.47 
Airport traffic Logarithm of air transport of passengers (total passengers embarked and disembarked) 8.83 1.86 
Geographic Distance Logarithm of geographical distance between investor country and NUTS-1 region 8.24 1.09 
Language Similarity Dummy variable indicating language similarity between investor country and  NUTS-1 region 0.21 0.41 
Wage Cost Logarithm of wage costs of engineers of host country 10.72 0.22 
B-index Logarithm of the B-index (R&D tax burden) of the host country -0.11 0.18 
High Technology Concentration Dummy variable indicating whether the NUTS-1 region has a high technology concentration (at industry level) 0.42 0.49 
High Self Citation Dummy variable indicating whether the self-citation ratio of the leader in NUTS- region is high (at industry level) 0.44 0.50 
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Table 5: Mixed Logit Analysis of European regional location choices for R&D investment projects, 2003-2008 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Technological Strength 0.838* 0.855* 1.177** 1.061** 
 
(0.429) (0.457) (0.480) (0.525) 
Academic Research Strength 0.695 0.366 1.138 0.639 
 
(1.397) (1.329) (1.449) (1.631) 
R&D Intensity 0.379 0.359 0.463 0.287 
 
(0.474) (0.465) (0.602) (0.589) 
Patent quality 0.390 0.383 0.591** 0.615** 
 
(0.242) (0.234) (0.271) (0.288) 
Backward Citation Intensity 0.299 0.258 0.414 0.492 
 
(0.239) (0.246) (0.310) (0.300) 
GDP Per Capita -1.866** -2.116*** -2.099** -2.444*** 
 
(0.763) (0.774) (0.850) (0.851) 
Population 0.171 0.255 0.431 0.468 
 
(0.412) (0.411) (0.458) (0.443) 
Firm's Previous Investments 0.005 0.852 0.161 -1.066 
 
(1.055) (0.771) (1.216) (1.974) 
Firms’s Previous R&D 35.208*** 31.809*** 42.131*** 69.863*** 
 
(7.079) (3.967) (7.599) (21.994) 
Unemployment Rate -1.164** -1.022** -1.037* -1.355** 
 
(0.498) (0.484) (0.566) (0.553) 
Airport traffic 0.717*** 0.715*** 0.699*** 0.760*** 
 
(0.192) (0.194) (0.204) (0.218) 
Geographic Distance -0.158 -0.296 -0.039 -0.311 
 
(0.420) (0.371) (0.442) (0.490) 
Language Similarity 0.705** 0.636** 0.770** 0.635* 
 
(0.311) (0.306) (0.357) (0.382) 
Wage Cost 0.560 0.765 -0.239 0.726 
 
(1.313) (1.482) (1.466) (1.660) 
B-index -2.776 -2.183 -2.997 -4.967* 
 
(2.420) (2.396) (2.758) (2.858) 
High Technology Concentration 
 
-0.749* 
  
  
(0.383) 
  High Technology Concentration /  
  
-4.889** 
 High Self-citation 
  
(2.163) 
 High Technology Concentration /  
  
-0.009 
 Low Self-citation 
  
(0.301) 
 Low Technology Concentration / 
  
-0.619 
  High Self-citation 
  
(0.712) 
 High Tech Concentration / High Dom.  
  
-26.012** 
Self-cit/ High Foreign Self-cit 
   
(12.777) 
High Tech Concentration / High Dom.  
  
-1.280 
 Self-cit/ Low Foreign Self-cit 
   
(1.474) 
High Tech Concentration / Low Dom.  
  
-2.519*** 
Self-cit / High Foreign Self-cit 
   
(0.749) 
High Tech Concentration / Low Dom.  
  
-0.331 
Self-cit /  Low Foreign Self-cit 
   
(0.815) 
Low Tech Concentration / High Dom.  
  
-17.326 
Self-cit / High Foreign Self-cit 
   
(15.123) 
Low Tech Concentration / High Dom.  
  
-0.379 
Self-cit / Low Foreign Self-cit 
   
(0.931) 
Low Tech Concentration / Low Dom.  
  
0.245 
Self-cit / High Foreign Self-cit       (0.350) 
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 Continuation Table 5 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Random parts coefficients 
   R&D Intensity 
   
     -1.945** 
Population 1.501***   1.657***     2.178***      2.355*** 
Firm's Previous Investments -5.193*   3.395**     6.279**     11.007* 
Geographic Distance 1.520**  -1.903***     2.106***     -2.770*** 
Wage Cost 
 
 -2.384* 
 
    2.997** 
B-index 
  
    -2.656** 
 Average Forward Citations 
  
    -1.304**     -1.430* 
High Technology Concentration / High Self-citation 
 
    -5.229*** 
 Low Technology Concentration / High Self-citation 
 
    3.346** 
 High Tech Concentration/ High Dom. Self-cit / High Foreign Self-cit     -20.081** 
Number of observations 7559  7559     7559     7559 
Number of projects 196  196     196     196 
Number of investing firms 152  152     152     152 
Number of regions (maximum) 64  64     64     64 
Wald chi² 154.2***  291.9***     178.2***    260.9*** 
  Notes: Error terms are cluster by investing firm. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.  
  Only significant random components of the coefficients are reported.   
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